Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Substantial research has been devoted to the effect of labor market regulations in several labor outcomes in the developing world (Heckman and Pagés, 2004) . However, the effects of specific dimensions of labor regulations have been much less studied. Furthermore, in developing countries there is a big gap between the de facto and the de jure regulation, as enforcement is weak and evasion is large. This paper studies the effect of more stringent de facto firing regulations on average firm size in the developing world. In the presence of adverse economic conditions, strict firing regulations increase the cost of firing and may severely discourage firms from adjusting their workforce. Moreover, strict firing regulations also likely affect the firm's hiring decisions. For example, in good times, as firms anticipate higher firing costs, it is plausible that firms hire fewer workers, to avoid future costs in laying them off.
Therefore, at least theoretically, it is unclear the overall effect of higher de facto firing costs on average firm size. This paper explores a large firm level data set across 63 developing countries. It explores within country variation in the enforcement of firing regulations to see how these affect total firm size in the developing world. Firing regulations refer to advance notice and procedural requirements that are mandatory when workers are fired. In most countries, advance notice procedures impose a pre-notification period. This usually delays the termination of employment with a firm as third parties need to be notified and be in agreement. There is evidence that stricter firing likely affect the employment choices of firms in the developing world (Boeri et al., 2008) .
We explore within country variation in the de facto firing regulations faced by firms. In developing countries there is a large gap between the written law and its effective implementation. Labor markets in developing countries are usually characterized by weak enforcement of the law and a large informal sector (UNDP Commission Report, 2004) . For this reason, the same regulation in countries with very different degrees of enforcement may produce different effects on given firm outcomes. In this paper, we compare total firm size, measured by total permanent employees, for firms facing different degrees of enforcement of firing regulations and located in countries with different degrees of stringency of firing regulations.
Exploring variation in enforcement in developing countries is conceptually closer to comparing countries with different degrees of de facto regulations (Almeida and Carneiro, 2009 ).
Most of the literature studying the effects of labor regulations has not taken into account variation in the enforcement of the law. Some recent exceptions include Boeri and Jimeno (2005) ; Caballero et al. (2004) ; Almeida and Carneiro (2007, 2009) ; Ronconi (2010) and Almeida and Aterido (2011) . For example, Almeida and Carneiro (2009) look at how enforcement of labor regulations in Brazil constrains firm size and other firm characteristics.
They proxy enforcement of labor regulation faced by each firm with the labor inspections at the city level. They show that stricter enforcement of labor regulations constrains firm size (almost all of this concentrated in unskilled workers) and leads to reduced use of informal labor.
Our paper is closely related to the empirical work exploring within country variation in the exposure of firms to different types of firing regulations. 1 In several countries (such as Italy or Spain) firms that are smaller than a given threshold are not required to comply with all labor regulations set by the law. This exemption provides a discontinuity in the effects of regulations within countries. Under certain conditions, the comparison between these two groups of firms 1 A related strand of the literature explores within-country time series variation in labor regulations in developing countries (including job protection laws). Besley and Burgess (2004) and Ahsan and Pagés (2009) explore time variation at the state-level in India and find that stricter pro-worker labor regulation has a negative impact on state aggregate employment.
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can be informative of the causal effects of the regulations on labor market outcomes. For example, Boeri and Jimeno (2005) and Abidoye, et al. (2009) document that workers of small firms are more likely to be laid-off as they are not subject to stringent employment protection.
However, Schivardi and Torrini (2008) report higher separation rates for the workers of the larger firms. This is likely explained by the increased use of temporary contracts. Earlier research tried to quantify the impact of labor regulations in developed countries, by exploring the cross country and time series variation in labor regulations (e.g. Lazear, 1990, Nickel and Layard, 1999) . These studies typically relied on the cross country variation in de jure labor market regulation. However, identification based on the cross country time series variation in de jure regulation has well-known shortcomings such as omitted variables, measurement error and the difficulty in determining the direction of causality (Micco and Pagés, 2006; Kugler, 2007) .
This paper investigates the link between de facto firing regulations and firm size. We explore a large firm-level dataset across several developing countries and compare firm size for firms facing different degrees of enforcement of firing regulations. We explore the Enterprise Surveys, collected by the World Bank. The data is particularly useful to analyze this topic. It collects detailed information on labor force characteristics, including alternative measures of firm size, as well as proxies for the enforcement of different types of regulations, including labor regulations. We also use the Doing Business dataset collected by the World Bank. In particular,
we explore the difficulty of firing index which captures cross country differences in the stringency of firing regulations in the de jure law. 2 We also use the rigidity of employment index 5 and the number of procedures to start a business. The former is a general measure of the degree of stringency of employment related regulations. It covers the difficulty in hiring, in adjusting work hours as well as the difficulty in firing workers. The number of procedures to start a business captures the number of procedures, including necessary permits and licenses, required for a company to be legally in operation.
Our prior is that firing regulations will be more binding when firms face stricter enforcement of the law. In other words, a stricter enforcement of firing regulations (or a more stringent de facto firing regulations) increases the cost to firms of adjusting labor and potentially will affect both hiring and firings, and ultimately firm size We follow Almeida and Aterido (2011) and measure enforcement of regulations with the number of days of visits done by labor inspections in each firm. We also use information on the total number of inspections, including labor, environment, fire, health, sanitation and tax inspections.
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Our empirical approach is close to a "differences-in-differences" model. We are interested in the effect of stricter de facto firing regulations (or the "treatment") on the firms' choice of workforce size. In this case, we could define "treatment" as facing a stricter enforcement and more rigid firing regulations in a country. Firms that face weaker enforcement can be considered as a "control group". We compare firms with similar observable characteristics (e.g. age, ownership type, sector of activity, export status and location) within the same country but differing in the degree of enforcement of labor regulations that they face. In our reduced form model, we account for the unobserved country and sector characteristics that entire period of his employment. This profile is therefore closer to the profile of a permanent employee with the firm.
6 are likely to be correlated with the de facto firing regulations and firm size (e.g. the level of development of each sector in the country), by including country-sector fixed effects. 4 We also control for several firm-level characteristics correlated with firm size and the strictness of the de facto firing regulation. In addition we control for differences across firms in the degree of enforcement of the labor law that they face.
Our findings show that firms that are subject to stricter de facto firing regulations (for example at the 90 th percentile of enforcement of labor market regulations) in a country with rigid firing regulations (e.g. Ecuador, in the 90 th percentile of the difficulty of firing index) are 15 percent smaller than firms subject to looser enforcement in a country with less rigid regulations (e.g. Guatemala, in the 10 th percentile of the difficulty of firing index). This reduction in firm size tends to be larger for the manufacturing sector and, especially in low technology sectors with higher labor intensity. It is reassuring to see that our results do not hold in countries that are characterized by weak rule of law.
Our findings bear important policy implications. A stricter enforcement of firing regulations in countries, where these laws are stricter, constrains firm size. This will lead to a lower employment rate unless smaller firm size is not compensated by increased entry of firms.
To the extent that economic growth is driven by growth of existing firms, rather than by the creation of new firms, the effect of strict de facto firing regulations on firm size matters for economic growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . High levels of labor regulations and extensive informality are associated with lower levels of economic growth (Loayza et al., 2006) In general, the adverse effects of different types of regulations on growth varies depend on the quality of the institutional environment. Taken together, the findings of this paper should not be 7 interpreted as suggesting to eliminate firing regulations altogether. Furthermore, a high quality institutional environment is indispensable for enhancing growth and development. However, in the developing world, with pervasive informality, a more effective policy recommendation is to promote more flexible labor laws coupled with higher compliance levels. This could happen instead of lifting heavily the enforcement of strict firing regulations.
5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the datasets used and presents summary statistics. Section 3 explains the empirical methodology. Section 4.1. reports the main empirical findings. Section 4.2 and 4.3 discuss several robustness checks, especially to address the concerns with the endogeneity of de facto firing regulations and the heterogeneity of the results to alternative groups of firms and countries Section 5 concludes.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We explore the Enterprise Surveys, collected by the World Bank, across 63 developing countries. 6 The surveys were conducted between 2002 and 2005 and the samples were designed to be representative of the population of firms according to their industry and location within each country.
5 Schneider (2005) estimates that the average the size of the shadow economy (as a percentage of the official GDP)
in 2002-2003 is 38% across 96 developing countries. He highlights the role of taxation and social security contributions together with strict labor market regulations as contributing to the informal sector. 6 The Enterprise Surveys are currently available for a larger set of countries. We restrict the attention to 63 countries due to the lack of information on the main variables of interest. This dataset has been used in many other studies (e.g. Svensson, 2003; Pierre and Scarpetta, 2006; Aterido et al., 2007; Almeida and Carneiro, 2009; Almeida and Aterido, 2011 The index capturing the difficulty in firing contains several components: (i) whether redundancy is disallowed as a basis for terminating workers; (ii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party o terminate a redundant worker; (iii) whether the employer needs to notify and seek approval from a third party to fire redundant workers;
(iv) whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate a group of 9 redundant workers; (v) whether the law requires the employer to reconsider reassignment or retraining options before redundancy termination; (vii) whether priority rules apply for redundancies; and (vii) whether priority rules apply for The average firm in the sample is 17 years old, employs 212 permanent workers and has a 1 out of 3 probability of being located in the country's capital city. Approximately, 32% of the firms in our sample report having temporary workers, which account for 98 employees. These account for 29% of the total workforce. 78% of the firms are domestically owned and 8% have some public ownership. 10 23% of the firms in our sample are located in large cities that have population greater than a million. In addition, 31% of the firms in our sample report exporting some of their output.
As to enforcement of labor regulations, the average firm in our sample spent 5 days last year in inspections and mandatory meetings with officials. This ranges from no inspections to 55 days. The average firm in our sample reports having spent on average 10 days in inspections of all types with officials. In addition, firms report that on average 8% of their senior management's time is spent in dealing with requirements imposed by government regulations. Moreover, 6% of the firm managers responded positively about whether they trust the judicial system to enforce their property rights in business disputes and only 5% of them agree that government officials interpret the regulations consistently. Figure 1 displays the average of the days of labor inspections by firm size and sector of activity. As expected, enforcement increases with firm size. This positive correlation holds across sectors since larger firms are more visible to the inspectors. Figure 2 shows that there is no strong correlation across the country level the rigidity in the de jure firing regulation index and the strictness of enforcement of labor regulations at the country level.
Empirical Approach
We examine whether the stringency of de facto firing regulations in developing countries affects firm size. Our prior is that a stricter de facto firing regulations increase the costs to firms of adjusting labor and may potentially affect both hiring and firings. The simple reduced form model we use relates the degree of enforcement of labor regulations faced by each firm with the outcomes of interest. 11 Let denote firm size in firm j in country c i.e., logarithm of total employment in the firm:
( 1) where is a measure of the de jure firing costs in country c, is a measure of the enforcement of the labor laws in firm j in country c, captures firm level pre-determined characteristics of interest of firm j located in country c and are time invariant fixed effects capturing country and sector unobserved characteristics. We measure total firm size with total permanent employees in the firm. We measure using the Doing Business difficulty of firing index. is measured by the total days of labor inspections in the firm. In we include a set of predetermined firm characteristics, including age, location of the firm, ownership characteristics (public or foreign capital) and export status. Our main coefficient of interest is the double difference term, .
The intuition behind our model is similar to a differences-in-differences approach. We want to estimate the effect of strict firing regulations (the "treatment") on the outcome variable firm size. Our hypothesis is that firms that are located in countries with strict de jure firing regulations and subject to strict enforcement of labor regulations choose their workforce size systematically differently. Hence, the treatment is determined by the interaction term, being subject to both strict enforcement and strict de jure regulations.
The point estimates for  can be used to quantify the percentage point difference in logarithm of firm size for a firm facing the 90 th percentile of the enforcement of the labor regulation relative to a firm facing the 10 th percentile in the enforcement in a country with rigid firing regulation (e.g. in the 90 th percentile of the difficulty of firing index) versus the same differential in a country with looser firing regulations (e.g. in the 10 th percentile of the difficulty of firing index). This difference is computed assuming that firms operate in the same sector and have the same set of observable characteristics (as captured by ). Our empirical approach is based on the underlying assumption that the set of country-sector fixed effects, , is constant 13 across firms, regardless of whether the firms are exposed or not to a strict enforcement of the law (Micco and Pagés, 2006; Almeida and Aterido, 2011 , have similar assumptions).
It is worth stressing that our empirical approach does not rely on exploring the variation in enforcement of the firing regulations across countries alone. The latter is likely to be endogenous to the firm outcomes. 12 Instead, we explore the differential effect of enforcement in countries with different degrees of rigidity in the firing regulations, after controlling for countrysector fixed effects, firm characteristics and the enforcement of labor (and also for the enforcement of other types of regulations). By controlling for country-sector fixed effects we are able to account for unobserved country-sector characteristics that are likely to be correlated with de facto labor regulations and with firm size (e.g. level of development of each sector in the country). 13 This will allow us to overcome the omitted variables problem at the country and sector level by exploring only within country and sector variation. By controlling for the country and sector fixed effects and the firm characteristics, we also hope to minimize the potential reverse causality problem that plagues most of the cross country work. By controlling for the degree of enforcement of labor regulations, we account for (unobservable) firm characteristics 12 A least squares regression of labor inspections on other firm characteristics shows that there is a systematic correlation across inspections and firm observable characteristics. In particular, firms that are older, fully-foreign owned, located in the capital city and managed by managers with a post-graduate degree tend to be inspected more frequently (results not reported but available upon request). 13 We refrain from presenting the results only exploring variation in the firing regulations across countries because, in the absence of any time series variation, it would not be possible to account for country time-invariant effects.
This raises serious concerns regarding potential country-level omitted variables. Moreover, it is likely that countries with larger firm sizes (and possibly lower employment creation) could demand stricter levels of protection. This would make it hard to determine the direction of causality when exploring only cross country variation in de jure regulation.
14 that could be simultaneously correlated with the enforcement and with firm size in countries with different degrees of rigidities in the firing regulations.
However, our identification also presents some shortcomings. One concern could be that enforcement of labor regulations captures the effects of other factors or institutions also correlated with firm size and with firing regulations. In this case the point estimates for may be biased. We will test the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of additional country variables correlated with the stringency of the de jure firing regulations, and interact them with the level of enforcement of the labor law. These will include the country's level of economic development (proxied by GDP per capita), indices that represent a country's institutional quality (rule of law, regulatory quality and the government control of corruption) and product market regulations (proxied by number of procedures to start a business in a country). Reassuringly, our main findings are robust to the inclusion of these control variables.
In addition, there could still be a general concern regarding the endogeneity of the interaction term, . Ideally, we would like to find an instrument that is simultaneously correlated with enforcement of labor regulation and is reasonably exogenous to the outcomes of interest. One possibility would be to follow Almeida and Carneiro (2007, 2009 ) and compute a measure of how costly it is to supply enforcement in each city. 14 Unfortunately, we do not know the cities where each firm is located, nor how the labor enforcement is administered across all the countries. In the absence of an analogous instrument, we propose a robustness check using alternative proxies for the enforcement of labor regulations. First, we compute the average number of labor inspections in the same city, sector and size group where the firm operates (excluding the own firm). Second, we compute a variable that is smoother than the distribution of enforcement at the country level, by assuming only the value zero and percentiles 25, 50 and 75 of the distribution of enforcement within each country. Both variables are positively and strongly correlated with the firm's own reported labor inspections although they are arguably more exogenous to total firm size. (e.g. in Ecuador) than in a country with looser regulations (e.g. in Guatemala). This is a large effect since the average log firm size in our sample is 3.8. 15 We consider a total of 844 categories for country-sector cells. 16 It is reassuring to see that all the results in table 2 go through if we were to control separately for country and sector fixed effects. The magnitudes of the effect vary between -0.00086 in column (1) to -0.00058 in column (9) (Results are not reported but available upon request).
Main Empirical Findings

The Effects of Enforcing Firing Regulations on Firm Size
Columns (2) through (9) of table 2 test the robustness of this finding to alternative robustness checks. In column (2) we add the set of firm level pre-determined controls. Because we are concerned that labor inspections are used for rent extraction motives, in column (3) we control for the total number of inspections faced by the firm and interact total number of inspections with de jure firing regulations. If firms where it is easier to extract rents will have more inspections, this will likely happen for all inspections and controlling for the total inspections, would mitigate this problem. Controlling for total inspections will likely to minimize this concern as long as the probability of having an inspection in order to extract rents is not higher for the labor inspections than for other inspections.
In column (4) we check for the possibility that the stringency of firing regulations is simply capturing the degree of development in the country. This is likely to be the case since it is well-documented in Botero et al. (2003) and Heckman and Pagés (2004) that there is a negative correlation between the strictness of de jure labor regulations and income levels. 17 To address this we control for the interaction between enforcement of labor regulations at the firm level and the logarithm of GDP per capita in each country. Our coefficient of interest hardly changes.
In columns (5) through (7) of table 2, we also test whether firing regulations are not capturing the effect of other country level institutions, omitted from the analysis but that could be likely to be correlated with these regulations. In particular, we consider differences across countries in the quality of several dimensions of governance and institutional quality. In particular, we consider country's rule of law, regulatory quality and government control of corruption. In column (8) we investigate whether our results could be capturing the impact of differences in entry regulations in the product market other than the effect of firing regulations.
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To account for this we control for the interaction between enforcement of labor regulations at the firm level and the number of procedures to start a business, which is a measure of how costly it is to establish a business in a given country. Finally, we investigate whether our findings could be capturing any effects of stringency of hiring regulations and the flexibility in hours. Column (9) controls for the rigidity of employment index, which is an average of the firing index we use and the difficulty of hiring and the rigidities in work hours. Reassuringly, our main results remain the same across all columns. In addition, the positive and significant coefficients of the interaction terms in columns (5) to (7) emphasize the positive impact of better quality institutions on firm size. Interestingly, the coefficient in column (9) is also positive and statistically strong. This implies that, firms facing stricter de facto hiring relations are associated with larger firm sizes.
Hiring regulations in the doing business index relates to the extent to which fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks and their maximum duration. This positive correlation likely captures the fact that countries that are more developed and have better institutions, have larger firms, but also a stricter de jure hiring regulations and better enforcement of regulations.
Additional Robustness Checks
One concern with the findings reported in our baseline specification, in column (4) of (2) and (3) we also check whether the enforcement could be capturing differences across firms in the manager's perception on the enforcement of property rights in the country or his/her perceptions about the consistency in the application of the regulations in the country.
Both variables may be correlated with the firms' choice on total size of the workforce as well as with the stringency of enforcement.
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Although our main results remain qualitatively the same, we get useful insights from these checks. Results also suggest that firms that report spending more time with officials are smaller in size. We also find evidence that greater perceptions are about the consistency of regulations and enforcement of property rights, the larger the firms are, which confirms the conduciveness of a favorable business environment.
Another concern relates with the possible endogeneity of the de facto firing regulations to firm size. In particular, the number of labor inspections faced by each firm is likely not random to the firm. Even though we do not explore the variation in enforcement alone, rather the interaction of labor inspections and the firing regulations at the country level, one could still be 19 In addition, we use two additional variables. First, we use the "share of sales the firm spends on gifts or making informal payments to public officials to get things done". Second, we use a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if gifts or informal payments were expected from the firm by labor or other inspectors. Our main results remain the same using these variables. So far, we have measured firm size using the total number of permanent employees in the sample. Table A3 in the appendix tests the robustness of our findings to alternative measures of firm size. First, in column (1) we consider total firm size by including both permanent and temporary workers. Although the Doing Business difficulty of firing index we explore likely captures better the cost of permanent workers, in most countries of our sample firms can choose 20 The sign of the bias is also unclear. On the one hand, one could expect that more enforcement is correlated with larger firm size if there is more enforcement in countries with better institutional quality which in turn is associated with larger firms. On the other hand, more enforcement could be associated with more evasion and smaller firm size if there is more enforcement in places with more evasion and more crime. 21 The variable requires enough variation within each country, city-sector-size cell. Statistics show that there is enough variation. The standard deviation of the mean inspections is 3.7 days (which compares with 5.2 in the days of labor inspections at the firm level).
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whether to offer permanent or temporary contracts. For example, table 1 in the appendix shows that 32% of the firms in our sample report employing some temporary workers. These account on average for 29% of the total permanent workforce. A priori it is unclear whether the negative correlation would remain. When firing costs increase it is possible that firms substitute away from permanent to temporary workers so that total firm size may eventually increase. However, it is also possible that the reduction in the permanent employees may not be fully offset by the increase in temporary contracts. The results in column (1) of table A3 show that the magnitude of the effects is still negative but is larger in absolute value than when using only permanent workers. 22 This implies that when the rigidity of the de facto firing regulations increase the total firm size (captured by permanent and temporary workers) is reduced further. This suggests that firms substitute away labor for other inputs, possibly capital. In column (2) we compute an alternative proxy of firm size. So far we have used the information on firm size in the year prior to the survey. However, the survey also collects data on the numbers of hires and fires during the previous year. With this information we can predict a proxy for current firm size. Finally, in column (3), we proxy total firm size with the logarithm of sales per employee at the firm level.
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Across specifications we still find a robust negative correlation between the de facto firing 22 To analyze this issue we have regressed total firm size, measured by the total of permanent employees, in the sample of firms available in column (1) in table A3. This sample is smaller as it excludes firms with missing information for temporary contracts. Our main coefficient of interest is -.00052 and thus is smaller than the one reported in column (1) of table A3. In addition, we also run our baseline specification using the number of temporary workers as the dependent variable. We find a negative and statistically strong coefficient. 23 Other studies in the literature also look at the effects of labor regulations on firm's sales (e.g. Micco and Pagés, 21 regulations and firm size. The only exception is for sales per employee whose effect is still negative but not statistically strong.
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Finally, we have also estimated equation (1) also using share of skilled workers as our dependent variable. We found robust evidence that stricter de facto firing regulations are associated with a more skilled workforce. This is in line with the results found by others that stringent regulations disproportionally hurt the unskilled workers (available on request).
Heterogeneity of the Effects
This section discusses several robustness checks for different samples. The first issue we discuss is whether the results are different for firms using different technologies. One might argue that firms differ in their need to adjust labor depending on the degree of the technological sophistication. Column (1) of table 4 restricts the sample only to manufacturing firms. In columns (2) and (3) we run the regression separately for high-tech and low-tech manufacturing firms. 25 Results shows that an increase in the stringency of the de facto firing regulations reduces firm size more in manufacturing firms than in services. In addition, the results in columns (2) and (3) show more pronounced effects for the low-tech manufacturing firms, which are relatively more dependent on labor. This follows the findings in Micco and Pagés (2006) who also find that low-tech firms are more affected by labor regulations.
Another possible concern is that our findings are driven by a possible sorting of firms into countries and regions with looser or stricter degrees of de facto firing regulations. For 24 Our results in columns (1) and (2) example, recent empirical work has shown the importance of labor market conditions in the receiving country in attracting foreign firms. 26 In column (4), we therefore restrict our sample only to domestic firms. This is likely a group of firms that is less sensitive to changing its location depending on the institutional quality and on the enforcement of regulations and laws.
Again, our main results remain showing that firms facing a stricter enforcement of firing costs tend to have smaller firm size.
Finally, in many countries regulations simply do not apply to firms below a given threshold. In the absence of data on enforcement, some studies have explored this discontinuity in the application of the de jure law to identify the effects of labor regulations on different labor market outcomes (Boeri and Jimeno, 2005; Schivardi and Torrini, 2008; Abidoye et al., 2009 ). In our data it is also true that there is greater enforcement levels for firms of larger sizes (see Figure   1 ). To check whether our findings are affected by this variation in the enforcement, column (5) reports the results of our baseline specification for the set of firms only with more than 5 workers. 27 It is reassuring to see that our results remain robust when we exclude from the sample this group of firms, possibly facing weaker enforcement. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 test this hypothesis. As expected, younger firms seem to be relatively more affected more stringent de facto firing regulations. Second, we test whether our results are driven by the low income economies. 28 Third, in columns (4) to (7) we test whether our findings are being driven by a specific region of the world by removing the countries in East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean and North Africa and Middle East, respectively, from the sample. Reassuringly, our main findings remain and imply significant changes in the size of the firms throughout all columns.
Finally, we investigate whether the results hold for countries with stronger or looser rule of law. Columns (8) and (9) Finally, the last set of robustness checks discusses the sensitivity of the results to alternative models and specifications. Table A4 in the annex check the robustness to considering different non-linear models. First, we consider that the effect of de jure regulation includes a quadratic term. Second, we explore a specification with the logarithm in the firing regulations.
Third, we check whether the results are driven only by the countries with high de facto firing 28 We defined countries as low and medium income as per the World Bank's classification in the year the data was collected.
29 It is reassuring to see that the results for the good rule of law countries go through all of the robustness checks reported in table 2 and in columns (1) through (4) 
Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of firing regulations on employment and the composition of employment at the firm level in developing countries. We explore the within-country variation in the enforcement of regulations in countries with different stringencies of labor law using a rich firm-level dataset. We find suggestive evidence that stricter firing rules in countries where de jure regulations are more rigid is associated with significantly smaller firm size controlling for firm characteristics and country-sector fixed effects. These effects are stronger in manufacturing and labor intensive firms.
Our results have important policy implications. First, strict firing regulations do constrain firm size in developing countries, as measured by the total number of permanent workers in the firm. Constraints to firm size can have negative consequences for growth if we consider that most of economic growth is due to growth in the existing firms as opposed to growth in the 30 In columns (1) and (2) we exclude the countries with the top 1% and 5% highest de jure firing regulations, respectively. Cameroon, Cape Verde, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Indonesia, Laos and Sri Lanka make the countries with the top 5% strictest firing regulations. In column (3) we exclude the extreme 5% values for (log) firm size. The results from excluding the top 1% and 2% firms in the (log) size distribution are available upon request.
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creation of new firms, as documented in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Kumar et al. (1999) .
Second, this impact on firm size may cause lower employment if the numbers of firms in the economy do not rise with stricter firing costs to compensate the fall in firm size.
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Abidoye (1) in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firm level controls include age of the firm (and its square), export status, fully, majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city dummies. Country-sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. P90-P10 differential is reported in last row. It quantifies the impact on log firm size of increasing enforcement from percentile 10 th to percentile 90 th in a country with looser firing regulations (at the 10 th percentile) relative to the same change in a country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90 th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1 . 
Inspections at the Firm Level
Dependent variable is the logaritm of permanent employees at the firm level. Table reports the least squares coefficients of eq. (1) in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered at the countrysector level are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firm level controls include age of the firm (and its square), export status, fully, majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city dummies. Country-sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. P90-P10 differential is reported in last row. It quantifies the impact on log firm size of increasing enforcement from percentile 10 th to percentile 90 th in a country with looser firing regulations (at the 10 th percentile) relative to the same change in a country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90 th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1 . In column (4) enforcement is proxied by average of labor inspections in the city-sector-size where the firm is operating, (excluding the firm's own value). In column (5) (1) in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered at the countrysector level are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firm level controls include age of the firm (and its square), export status, fully, majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city dummies. Country-sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. P90-P10 differential is reported in last row.
It quantifies the impact on log firm size of increasing enforcement from percentile 10 th to percentile 90 th in a country with looser firing regulations (at the 10 th percentile) relative to the same change in a country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90 th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1 . (1) in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firm level controls include age of the firm (and its square), export status, fully, majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city dummies.
Country-sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. P90-P10 differential is reported in last row. It quantifies the impact on log firm size of increasing enforcement from percentile 10 th to percentile 90 th in a country with looser firing regulations (at the 10 th percentile) relative to the same change in a country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90 th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1 . Column (1) estimates the base model for firms that are younger than 5 years old and column (2) estimates the base model for firms that are 5 or more years old. Column (1) to (5) estimate the base model excluding from the sample low income countries in column (3), excluding the firms in East Asia and Pacific in column (4), Europe and Central Asia in column (5), Latin America and Caribbean in column (6), and North Africa and Middle East in column (7). Column (8) and (9) estimates the base model by spliting the sample according to the median value of the rule of law indicator taken from Kaufmann and Kraay (2003) .
Source : Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys . 
Manager's Perception on Regulations Consistent in the Country
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the response of the firm manager to the question "How would you generally rate the efficiency of government in delivering services (e.g. public utilities, public transportation, security, education and health etc.)" is "Somewhat efficient", "Efficient" or "Very efficient".
Manager's Perception on Property Rights Enforced in the Country
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the response of the firm manager to the question "I am confident that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and property rights in business disputes." To what degree do you agree with this statement?" is "Tend to agree", "Agree in most cases" or "Fully agree".
Manager's Perception on Regulations Consistent in the Country
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the response of the firm manager to the question "How would you generally rate the efficiency of government in delivering services (e.g. public utilities, public transportation, security, education and health etc.)" is "Somewhat efficient", "Efficient" or "Very efficient". Country Level Variables Definition
Difficulty in Firing
Difficulty of Firing Index (Doing Business) : The difficulty of firing index has 8 components: (i) whether redundancy is disallowed as a basis for terminating workers; (ii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party (such as a government agency) to terminate 1 redundant worker; (iii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party to terminate a group of 9 redundant workers; (iv) whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate 1 redundant worker; (v) whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate a group of 9 redundant workers; (vi) whether the law requires the employer to reassign or retrain a worker before making the worker redundant; (vii) whether priority rules apply for redundancies; and (viii) whether priority rules apply for reemployment.
Rigidity of Employment
Rigidity of Employment Index (Doing Business) : The rigidity of employment index is the average of 3 subindices: a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of hours index and a difficulty of firing index. All the subindices have several components. And all take values between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation.
Procedures to Start a Business Number of Procedures to start a business (Doing Business): the number of all procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business.
Regulatory Quality Government Regulatory Quality (Kaufmann & Kraay) : Regulatory Quality is the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Rule of Law Government Rule of Law (Kaufmann & Kraay) : the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of the society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. (1) in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firm level controls include age of the firm (and its square), export status, fully, majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city dummies. Country-sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. P90-P10 differential is reported in last row. It quantifies the impact on log firm size of increasing enforcement from percentile 10 th to percentile 90 th in a country with looser firing regulations (at the 10 th percentile) relative to the same change in a country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90 th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1 . (1) in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firm level controls include age of the firm (and its square), export status, fully, majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city dummies. Country-sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. P90-P10 differential is reported in last row. It quantifies the impact on log firm size of increasing enforcement from percentile 10 th to percentile 90 th in a country with looser firing regulations (at the 10 th percentile) relative to the same change in a country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90 th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1 . In columns (4) and (5) (1) in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firm level controls include age of the firm (and its square), export status, fully, majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city dummies. Country-sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. P90-P10 differential is reported in last row. It quantifies the impact on log firm size of increasing enforcement from percentile 10 th to percentile 90 th in a country with looser firing regulations (at the 10 th percentile) relative to the same change in a country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90 th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1 . Column (1) excludes firms in Cameroon and Georgia. Column (2) excludes firms in Cameroon, Capeverde, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Indonesia, Laos and Sri Lanka.
